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ABSTRACT
In this paper we look at the distribution of wages to examine the ex-
tent and cause of the increasing wage inequality in Mexico over the last
two decades (1984 to 2000). To understand the causes of the increase in
inequality over time we do a counterfactual analysis. We find that over
the last two decades not only did the inequality increase, there also was an
erosion of real wages, and it’s the middle class which was aﬀected the most.
Main reason for the decrease in real wages was the declining unionization
in the country. While the main reason for the rise in inequality was the
changing distribution of skills.
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1 Introduction
Mexico signed GATT in 1986 and NAFTA in 1994, with two free trade
agreements in as many decades it was expected that as the Mexican prod-
uct markets integrate with the rest of the world the factor prices would
also converge, particularly with its rich neighbor, the US (Lederman et al.,
‘Lessons from NAFTA’, World Bank, 2003). Standard neoclassical trade
theories suggested that as the country, which is abundant in unskilled labour,
opens itself to trade the relative returns to the unskilled workers would in-
crease, lowering the wage inequality in the economy. Instead two decades
on, we observe a rise in the relative returns to the skilled workers leading to
increased wage inequality (Hanson, 2003).
In this paper we look at the distribution of wages to examine the ex-
tent and cause of the increasing wage inequality in Mexico over the last two
decades. We bring the institutional and trade arguments in one frame-
work, and compare their relative contribution to the rise in inequality. To
quantify the contribution of diﬀerent factors to increase in inequality we do
counterfactual analysis in the spirit of work done by Oaxaca (1973).
Oaxaca’s work focused on ‘means’ and was based on questions such as,
‘how much would a worker, with the mean characteristics of 1984 workforce,
have been paid in 2000?’ Generalization of Oaxaca’s method to decompose
distributions gives us the ‘counterfactual distributions’. This involves asking
questions like, ‘what would the distribution of wages be if the distribution
of the individual attributes had remained as in 1984 and workers had been
paid according to the wage schedule observed in 2000?’. DiNardo, Fortin
and Lemieux (1996), DFL henceforth, proposed a semiparametric method
to estimate these counterfactual distributions, which we will be using here.
The literature on Mexico has typically attributed the increased inequality
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to two broad factors: (1) trade liberalization and foreign direct investment,
and (2) changing labor market institutions. The first, argues that trade lib-
eralization and increased foreign direct investment have lead to an increase
in the relative demand for skilled labor, leading to increased relative returns
to education, which in turn has lead to an increase in wage inequality in
the country (Cragg and Epelbaum, 1996; Feenstra and Hanson, 1997; Han-
son and Harrison, 1999). The second view relies on the declining power of
unions (Panagides et al., 1994; Fairris, 2003) and falling real value of the
minimum wage (Cortez, 2001; Fairris et al., 2005) as the causes of rising
inequality.
There are three main limitations of the current papers. First, most
of the studies rely on summary measures for their analysis - measures of
inequality, mean wage diﬀerentials by industries and skill levels. Sum-
mary measures of inequality, though good starting points, are limited in the
information they convey; they often give conflicting results;1 further, de-
composition of inequality indices into diﬀerent factors, contributing to the
change in inequality, can be sensitive to the measure used.2
Second, while the changes in the returns to education and the increasing
relative demand for the skilled labor has been analyzed in the literature,
nothing has been said about the changing distribution of the skills, and its
impact on the wage distribution.
Third, most studies in this area are limited both in the horizon they
cover and the data set they use. Majority of the studies have looked at
only the 1980s and the early half of the 1990s (exceptions being, Hanson,
2003; and Esquivel et al., 2003). Feenstra and Hanson (1997) and Hanson
1“...they [inequality measures] will rank the same set of distributions in diﬀerent ways,
simply because of their diﬀering sensitivity to incomes in diﬀerent parts of the distribu-
tions.” Litchfield ( 1999).
2Shorrocks (1982) points out the sensitivity of decomposition analysis to the choice of
the inequality index. There are regression based methods also available to decompose
inequality, they too suﬀer from the same limitations as the decomposition of inequality
statistics (see Fields, 2002).
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and Harrison (1999) in their study used macro-survey data of manufacturing
plants; Cragg and Epelbaum (1996) in their analysis use micro level data for
only 16 urban areas; Esquivel et al. (2003) look only at the manufacturing
sector; Hanson (2003) in the only exception, he uses a 1% random sample
from 1990 and 2000 census data. The implications that one can draw from
these studies are thus limited in scope.
This paper is diﬀerent from the other studies not only in looking at a
longer horizon but also in the methodology used. Looking at the longer
horizon helps us study the impact of both the liberalization of the 1980s
and free trade agreements of 1990s, on the wage inequality. We use micro
(household) level data, which is nationally representative, covers larger share
of population, and has more detailed information on the workers character-
istics. More importantly, instead of looking only at the summary measures
of inequality we analyze the entire distribution of wages.
Looking at how the distributions have changed over time, and an indi-
cation of which segments of the distribution have been eﬀected the most
over time, can be important in understanding the factors responsible for the
observed changes. By focusing on the distributions we are able to com-
ment on, and observe, multiple features of the wage distribution and not
just the mean, variance, or some other summary statistic.3 While there
are a number of methods available to decompose the summary measures
that characterize a distribution, DFL paper is seminal in providing a way
to decompose the whole distribution.4
In section 2 we give details of the data used in this paper and an expla-
nation of how the actual and the counterfactual distributions are estimated.
The results of the empirical exercise are put forth in section 3 of the paper,
we focus on three explanatory factors: (i) changing levels of unionization;
3Jenkins (1995) and Cameron (2000) provide empirical evidence in support of using
distributions as opposed to summary measures of inequality.
4Lemieux (2002) and Jenkins and van Kermer (2005) oﬀer alternative approaches,
derived from the original DFL approach.
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(ii) changing industrial aﬃliations of the workers; and (iii) the changing
distribution of skills. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Data and methodology
The data used for the analysis is from Encuesta National de Ingresos y Gas-
tos de los Hogares (ENIGH). These are the national household surveys that
began in 1984 and continued in 1989, 1992, and every two years thereafter.
The number of households interviewed by ENIGH is diﬀerent for each year
of the survey; the sample analyzed here, for each year, ranges from 15% to
20% of the total ENIGH sample. This is the only Mexican data set that
gives information on the union status of the workers. The survey employs
a ‘stratified sampling’ technique, so we use sample weights made available
by ENIGH in the analysis below.
The sample utilized in this study is only of the working individuals from
the surveyed households. We look only at the wage earners and drop the
self-employed from our sample. The main reasons for dropping the self-
employed are: the focus of this study is on the labor market institutions
(unions) and returns to skills. Concept of unions is only relevant for the
wage earners (the survey does not ask the self-employed about their union
status). Further, one cannot distinguish between the returns to skills and
the returns to capital for the self-employed.5
The earnings variable is the hourly wage, and is computed from the
reported earnings (net of taxes) during the month before the survey and
reported hours of work in the week before the survey. To insure an accurate
measure of the wage all those who are working without pay or those who
hold more than one job are also excluded.6 In the estimate of the wage, no
5According to McKenzie and Woodruﬀ (2003) returns to investment are substantial in
Mexico, particularly at low levels (15% a month for investment levels below US$ 200).
6In the earlier years of the survey information for the union status was collected only
for the primary job of the respondent. This is another reason to exclude those with more
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fringe benefits, tips, bonuses or commissions are included. Throughout the
study we use real wages. To obtain real wages nominal wages are deflated
by the National Consumer Price Index, reported in the Annual Report (1996
and 2001), published by Banco de Mexico.
In Table 1 we report the descriptive statistics for the years 1984 to 2000.7
In 1984 the median wage was 3.4% higher than the mean wage; by year 2000,
the median wage was 6% below the mean wage, indicating a change in the
skewness of the distribution from negatively skewed to positively skewed.
The average real wages over this period fell by 7% and the median real
wages fell by 15%; most of the fall in real wages is a result of the currency
crisis of 1994.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
1984 1989 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Mean log real wages 3.743 3.722 3.768 3.854 3.464 3.495 3.674
Median log real wages 3.777 3.687 3.737 3.657 3.399 3.411 3.615
SD of log real wages 0.765 0.780 0.806 0.838 0.827 0.845 0.815
Gini coeﬃcient 0.113 0.114 0.121 0.124 0.137 0.136 0.127
Coeﬃcient of variation 0.204 0.210 0.214 0.217 0.239 0.242 0.222
Number of observations 3644 10358 8925 10891 11935 9299 8824
Three summary measures of inequality are reported here, standard de-
viation (SD) of log real wages, Gini coeﬃcient and coeﬃcient of variation.
Whatever measure of inequality we use, wage inequality in Mexico increased
between 1984 and 2000. Between 1984 and 2000 the SD of log real wages
increased by 6.5%, coeﬃcient of variation increased by 8.8% and the Gini
than one job.
7The broad trends in inequality are robust to the inclusion of the self-employed in the
sample. This is supported by the findings of Airola and Juhn (2005).
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coeﬃcient increased by 12%. Increase in inequality seems to relent in the
mid 1990s, though the cut oﬀ period of when the increase stopped is diﬀerent
depending on the measure of inequality used.8
In the subsequent analysis we focus only on the two end periods — 1984
and 2000; the horizon is long enough to consider the eﬀect of almost all major
changes faced by the economy — the 1982 debt crisis, signing of GATT in
1986 and NAFTA in 1994, and three currency crisis. Choosing 2000 as the
end date means we are well beyond the last big currency crisis of 1994 and
the severe recession of 19959; it also means we do not have to arbitrarily
pick the date when the inequality stabilized, as all measures indicate some
stabilization by 2000.
In Figure 1 the kernel density estimates of log real wages of 1984 and
2000 are shown. A clear change in the shape of the distribution’s is evident.
Both the distributions are unimodal but the peak density of the distribution
falls dramatically from 1984 to 2000. The reduced peak indicates fewer
individuals working in the middle group, giving an indication of ‘shrinking
middle-class’ in Mexico.10 The 2000 distribution is to the left of the 1984
distribution and shows higher dispersion. Decrease in mean and increase in
inequality by itself should lead to an increase in lower tail of the distribution,
what we see here instead is an increase in mass in the upper tail — indicating
that the distribution has also become positively skewed over time. Any
explanation for increase in inequality should also be able to explain the
above mentioned changes in the distribution of wages over time.
Before we embark on the analysis of what explains this increase in in-
equality an explanation of notation and the estimation of the nonparametric
distributions is provided.
8Gonzalez and McKinley (1997) also point out the conflicting results given by the
diﬀerent summary measures of inequality, for Mexico.
9In 1995 GDP fell by 6.2%. Source: Banco de Mexico.
10Decline of the middle class is a hypothesis studied for both the UK and the US, using
parametric and non-parametric approaches, see Jenkins (1995), Bradbury (1986), and
references therein.
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2.1 Estimating the counterfactual distributions
Consider a vector (w, z), where w is wages and z is a vector of individual
attributes, such as age, gender, union status, education etc.. Let the joint
distribution of w and z at any time t be represented as F (w, z; tw = tz = t),
where tw and tz indicate the date of w and z (here t). The density of wages
at any point in time,ft(w), can be written as:
ft(w) =
Z
z
dF (w, z; tw = tz = t) (1)
=
Z
z
f(w|z; tw = t)dF (z; tz = t)
≡ f(w; tw = tz = t).
The last identity in (1) is notational, it shows that the distribution of w
is defined in period t, conditional on the distribution of z in the period t.
Using the notation in (1), the actual density of wages in year 2000 will be
written as: f(w; tw = tz = 2000). Estimate of the distribution as expressed
in (1) is given by,
bfh(wj) = 1
n
nX
i=1
θi
h
K
µ
wj −Wi
h
¶
, (2)
where (2) represents the kernel density estimate of a univariate distribution
based on a random sample (W1, ...,Wn) of size n. θi are the sample weights,
K(.) is the kernel function that depends on the distance of Wi from wj , and
the sample size through h, which is the window width. In the empirical
work, we use the Gaussian kernel and h = 1.06(σw)n−1/5, where σw is the
standard deviation of the random sample.11
11Estimation of the distribution, given in equation (2), depends on the choice of h
and K. Of the two its the choice of h that is more critical. For further details on
nonparametric estimation of density functions and the choice of diﬀerent h and K refer
to Silverman (1986) and Chapter 2, Pagan and Ullah (1999).
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Estimation of the counterfactual distribution involves holding z or diﬀer-
ent components of it (such as union status) at the earlier year (1984) levels
- i.e., to estimate what the distribution of wages in 2000 would be if the
distribution of z had remained the same as in 1984. In terms of notation
in (1), we are interested in:
f c(w) ≡ f(w; tw = 2000, tz = 1984). (3)
The distribution as expressed in (3) is the hypothetical counterfactual
distribution, where superscript c is used to denote the counterfactual distri-
bution. The hypothetical density f c(w) is given as,
fc(w) =
Z
z
f(w|z; tw = t)dF (z; tz = s), (4)
where s is any time period diﬀerent from t (s 6= t).
To estimate the counterfactual distribution re-write (4) as:
f c(w) =
Z
z
f(w|z; tw = t)Ψ(z)dF (z; tz = t), (5)
where Ψ(z) is a reweighting function defined as:
Ψ(z) =
dF (z; tz = s)
dF (z; tz = t)
. (6)
Equation (5) is now identical to (1), with the exception of the reweighting
function. Once the estimate of this reweighting function is available, the
counterfactual distribution can be estimated as:
bf ch(wj) = 1n
nX
i=1
θibΨi
h
K
µ
wj −Wi
h
¶
. (7)
What exactly does this reweighting function do? What is the economic
meaning of this function? Before answering these questions we introduce
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some more notation. In our analysis below we will focus on the follow-
ing individual characteristics: u a union dummy, where 1 represents union
members and 0 otherwise; e indicates industrial aﬃliation, where e = 1 if
the individual is employed in the industrial sector and 0 otherwise; x is a
vector of individuals age (proxy for experience) and education, which taken
together constitute labor market skills.12 We split the vector of individual
characteristics: z ≡ (u, e, x, g, r), where g, the gender dummy, equals 1 for
males and 0 otherwise, and r indicates the region of residence.13 z−k de-
notes the vector of individual characteristics z without the variable k. For
example, z−u indicates vector z without u, so z−u ≡ (e, x, g, r).14
To illustrate what the reweighting function does consider the impact of
changing levels of unionization on the wage distribution. For the impact of
de-unionization we generate a counterfactual distribution that would have
prevailed in 2000, had the union levels remained as they were in 1984, keep-
ing the distribution of all other individual characteristics as in 2000, and the
workers getting paid according to the wage schedule observed in 2000. In
terms of notation in (4) the distribution we want is:
f(w; tw = tz−u = 2000, tu|z−u = 1984) (8)
=
Z Z
f(w|u, z−u; tw = 2000)dF (u|z−u; tu|z−u = 1984)dF (z−u|tz−u = 2000).
Which can be written as,
12While age is a good proxy for labor market experience for men, it is likely to overesti-
mate the actual experience for women. Alternate definition of skill was used, where skill
is captured only by the education, the results are not qualitatively diﬀerent from those
presented here.
13Details of all the individual characteristics with their definition are reported in Table
(A1), Appendix A of the paper.
14Elements of vector z−k are control variables. Analysis was done separately by gender
but the results are not qualitatively diﬀerent from those presented here for the whole
sample.
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Z Z
f(w|u, z−u; tw = 2000)Ψu(z)dF (u|z−u; tu|z−u = 2000)dF (z−u|tz−u = 2000),
(9)
where the reweighting function Ψu(z) is defined as,
Ψu(z) ≡
dF (u|z−u; tu|z−u = 1984)
dF (u|z−u; tu|z−u = 2000)
(10)
= u
µ
Pr(u = 1|z−u; tu|z−u = 1984)
Pr(u = 1|z−u; tu|z−u = 2000)
¶
+(1− u)
µ
Pr(u = 0|z−u; tu|z−u = 1984)
Pr(u = 0|z−u; tu|z−u = 2000)
¶
.
The first line identity in (10) is obtained by substituting the expression on
the right hand side into (9) and canceling out the denominator. The second
line equality is derived by noting that u only takes values 0 or 1.
This weight represents the change in the probability between 1984 and
2000 that an individual, defined by characteristics z−u, is a union member
or not. The reason we control for the individual characteristics z−u is to
keep the relationship between unionization and the individual characteristics
at the 1984 level. All this reweighting function does is, it up-weights the
individuals in the union sector by a factor that is proportional to the decrease
in unionization in the economy and similarly down-weights the non-union
sector employees.
The conditional probabilities in the reweighting function are estimated
using a probit model:
Pr(u = 1|z−u; tu|z−u = t) = Pr(² > −β0H(z−u)) = 1− Φ(−β0H(z−u)).
(11)
The above equation is estimated for both 1984 and 2000. The estimated
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coeﬃcients bβ for each year are retained. To obtain the fitted probabilities
in (10): for the numerator the 1984 coeﬃcients and for the denominator the
2000 coeﬃcients are used with the 2000 sample, respectively.
3 Explaining the inequality
3.1 Institutions: De-unionization
We start with the institutional explanation proposed in the literature. The
institutional factors cover the role of unions and the impact of minimum
wage on the wages. In our analysis we will focus only on changing union-
ization levels. This is not to say that analysis of minimum wage is not
important. Analysis of minimum wage in distributional setting is not
straightforward for Mexico. Minimum wages in Mexico are set by regions
and occupations, there is no unique national minimum wage that one can
work with. Thus the analysis of minimum wage deserves a separate analysis
by itself (see Fairris et al. 2005; Maloney et al., 2001).
Impact of decline of labor unions in Mexico has been explored by Fair-
ris (2003 and 2005), where the author finds declining unionization and the
decreasing bargaining power of the unions to be an important factor in ex-
plaining the increase in inequality in Mexico. The decreasing union mem-
bership and declining union power can not only help explain the increasing
inequality but also shed light on the decline in middle class jobs. The
argument given by Davis and Huston (1992) is that “unions convert jobs
that probably weren’t middle-income jobs based on the skills required, into
middle-income jobs.” Decline in the unions pushes people from the middle
of the distribution to the lower tail of the distribution, as these people were
in the middle only because of the union action.
Another eﬀect that the unions have is to reduce the overall dispersion in
the wage distribution. Unions usually take wages out of competition and
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depress the wage structure with respect to the productive characteristics
(such as education and occupation) thus lowering the overall dispersion.
Once unions lose their power and/or the unionization rates go down, the
wage structure is less leveled, thus increasing dispersion. In either case
while some workers move from the middle to the lower tail of the distribution
the others might move from the middle to the upper tail.
In our sample 25.4% of the individuals were unionized in 1984. This
number decreased to 16% by 2000. We compare the average wages and the
standard deviation of wages across the two groups in Table 2.
Average wage in the union sector is higher than the average wage in the
non-union sector in both the years, with gap remaining almost the same over
time. Dispersion in wages, as measured by standard deviation of wages, is
higher for the non-union sector compared with the union sector, this gap
however has decreased (almost halved) over time. Increase in inequality was
also higher for the union sector. Standard deviation of wages in the union
sector increased by almost 29% from 1984 to 2000, that for the nonunion
sector increased by only 3.87%.
Table 2
Union vs. Non-union workers
Mean and Standard deviation (SD) of log real wages
Union Members Non-union Members
Mean SD Mean SD
1984 4.199 0.506 3.588 0.776
2000 4.192 0.652 3.575 0.806
Based on the evidence of the standard deviation of wages, unions are
not as strong a force of equalizing wages in 2000 as they were in 1984, it
would seem we have evidence not only for the declining union membership,
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but also of declining union power.15 To see whether, and to what extent,
de-unionization has lead to the observed changes in the distribution of wages
we generate a counterfactual distribution.16
Figure 2, gives the counterfactual distribution adjusted for the union
eﬀects. The counterfactual distribution of 2000 is to the right of the actual
2000 distribution. If the union levels had remained as they were in 1984
and the workers were paid according to the wage schedule of 2000, then the
real wages in year 2000 would have been higher than those actually observed
in 2000.
3.2 Trade liberalization
Starting from 1985 Mexico has seen radical trade reforms and liberalization
(Lustig, 1998 and 2001). Import licensing has almost been eliminated, tariﬀ
and quota restrictions have been substantially reduced. Adjustments in the
labor market, as a result of these reforms, are reflected through changes in
the employment and wages. For Mexico most of the adjustment took place
in form of declining real wages. Downward flexibility of real wages meant
less aggregate employment eﬀects.17 Here we will look at the employment
and wage eﬀects separately.
3.2.1 Employment shifts
Decreasing employment share of the industrial (particularly manufacturing)
sector jobs is often cited as the leading cause of decline in the middle-class
jobs and an increase in inequality (Bluestone and Harrison, 1988; Davis and
15Over the 1980s and the 1990s government intervention in the labor market weakened
the labor movement in Mexico, which contributed to the rise in wage inequality, see
Gonzalez and McKinley (1997) and Fairris (2005).
16Looking at the de-unionization rates will not be able to fully capture the selection bias
or the general equilibrium (spillover) eﬀect of unions, see Lewis (1986) and Card (1996)
for details.
17Refer to Revenga (1997) and Feliciano (2001) for the details of the employment and
wage eﬀects of trade liberalization in Mexico.
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Huston, 1992; Valletta, 1997). The argument is that as the high technology
and service jobs increase the overall inequality also increases; these service
sector jobs, which tend to have high variance, are replacing the basic man-
ufacturing jobs, which are the mainstay of the blue-collar middle class and
which tend to have low variance.18
De-industrialization (or the decreasing employment in the industrial sec-
tor) is often associated with high-income countries, so this argument might
make sense in countries like US, but not so in developing countries like Mex-
ico. This argument is particularly diﬃcult to make for Mexico, given the
trade liberalization that the economy faced over this period. If anything
the employment in the industrial sector, which is also largely the tradeable
sector of the economy, should have increased.
We start by looking at the employment shares, average wages and stan-
dard deviation of wages across the diﬀerent sectors of the economy in our
sample, reported in Table 3. The share of employment in the industrial
sector over this period increased by 6.2%. All sectors saw a decrease in the
real wages over this period, however the largest decline in the real wages
was observed for the industrial sector with real wages decreasing by 13%.
Inequality in wages also increased for the industrial and the services sectors
by 10% and 8.5%, respectively. The standard deviation of wages in the
services sector is higher compared to that in the industries and this gap
increased over time.
18The academic debate on the issue is however far from over. For example, for US,
Murphy and Welch (1993) and Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) find no eﬀect of industry
shifts on average wages and the variance of the wage distribution respectively.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics by sectors
Mean and Standard deviation (SD) of log real wages;
Employment shares (%)
1984 2000
Mean SD Share Mean SD Share
Agricultural 3.047 0.673 12.60 2.904 0.623 9.22
Industrial 3.798 0.672 33.34 3.665 0.739 35.42
Services 3.871 0.754 54.07 3.808 0.818 55.36
We do have some evidence of industrial shift in Mexico. Trade liber-
alization has lead to growth in employment in the industrial sector. This
by itself should mean more people are employed in the middle class jobs,
resulting in lower inequality. However when we look at the wage distribu-
tion we see a decline in the middle class jobs. To see where exactly in the
distribution the changing nature of industrial employment has its impact we
generate a counterfactual distribution.
The question we ask is, ‘what would the density of wages be if the in-
dustrial employment shares had remained at their 1984 level and workers
had been paid according to the wage schedule observed in 2000?’. The
distribution we are interested in is:
f(w; tw = tz−e = 2000, te|z−e = 1984). (12)
The detailed expression for this counterfactual distribution will be sim-
ilar to that in equations (8) and (9), with the reweighting function defined
similarly to that in (10), except instead of u, now we will have e.
Figure 3 gives the counterfactual distribution adjusted for the industrial
employment shares. The two distributions are not very diﬀerent, though
the counterfactual distribution shows slight decreased mass in the middle.
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The decreased mass in the middle for the 2000 counterfactual distribution
is consistent with the lower levels of employment in the industrial sector in
1984. The employment eﬀect, however, is not consistent with the overall
shift observed in the distribution.
3.2.2 Changing skills
The major impact of liberalization, as mentioned above, was however not
in employment adjustments but the wage adjustments. The increased dis-
persion of wages is largely linked to the increased relative demand for the
skilled labor over the last two decades. The increased demand for skilled la-
bor could be due to liberalization and/or skill biased technological changes.19
While the increasing returns to skill and the demand for skills has been an-
alyzed, not much has been said about the change in the distribution of skills
itself.
In our sample over the last two decades the average years of education
in Mexico increased from 6.9 years in 1984 to 8.7 years in 2000, over the
same period the median years of education increased from 6 to 9 years.
The standard deviation of years of schooling increased by only 2% over this
period. The average age of the work force over these two decades has gone
up from 29 to 31 years. This increase in supply of skilled labor has been
noted by others as well, see Hanson (2003) and Airola and Juhn (2005).
The increased supply of skilled labor could be due to a number of factors:
supply response to demand shifts, government polices and the household
decisions to invest in human capital.20
19Esquivel et al (2003) look at inequality in Mexico over the period 1988-2000. Over the
entire period they suggests that it’s the skill-biased technological change that has caused
an increase in inequality; trade liberalization in fact was an equalizing force before 1994
and had no eﬀect on dispersion of wages after 1994. Given their findings there should
be little to no change in inequality prior to 1994, and a large increase after 1994 — this
however is not what we observe in the data.
20If the demand changes had taken place without the supply response the gap between
the returns to high skilled and low skilled workers would have been even greater. Thus
any simulation done will actually underestimate the eﬀect of the change in the skill dis-
16
As the workforce ages and gets more educated the changing skill distri-
bution will change the wage distribution. Higher education and experience
means higher returns in the labor market, which means there will be an
upward mobility of the people - moving them from the lower tails to the
middle and from the middle to the upper tail - the entire distribution shifts
to the right. Such a movement of the workforce may or may not cause
an increase in dispersion of wages. Robinson (1976) presents a theoretical
model where, as the proportion of the educated people in the society in-
creases, the inequality first increases and then starts decreasing (inverted
U-shaped relationship). This however holds only if we consider two groups,
skilled and unskilled. In case of more than two groups, as in our case with
diﬀerent levels of education and labor market experience, the relationship
cannot be predicted analytically.
How has the changing distribution of skills impacted the wage distribu-
tion? To capture the impact of the changing skill distribution we generate
another counterfactual distribution. We want a distribution of wages such
that the individuals have the skill distribution of 1984 but are paid according
to the wage schedule of 2000. Such a counterfactual is given by:
f(w; tw = tz−x = 2000, tx|z−x = 1984) (13)
=
ZZ
f(w|x, z−x; tw = 2000)dF (x|z−x; tx|z−x = 1984)dF (z−x|tz−x = 2000)
=
ZZ
f(w|x, z−x; tw = 2000)Ψx(z)dF (x|z−x; tx|z−x = 1984)dF (z−x|tz−x = 2000),
where x as defined earlier, is the vector of age, age squared and education
dummies. In this case the reweighting function is obtained by applying the
Baye’s Law:
tribution. (We thank one of the referees for bringing this point to our attention.)
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Ψx(z) ≡
dF (x|z−x; tx|z−x = 1984)
dF (x|z−x; tx|z−x = 2000)
(14)
=
Pr(tx = 2000)
Pr(tx = 1984)
Pr(tx = 1984|x)
Pr(tx = 2000|x) .
This function represents the relative probability of observing an individ-
ual with characteristics (skills) x in the 1984 versus 2000, normalized by the
conditional probability of being in either sample. To estimate the condi-
tional probabilities, observations from 1984 and 2000 are pooled, a dummy
variable for time is generated and a probit model is estimated. The un-
conditional probabilities are simply the number of observations in year t,
divided by the total number of observations.
Figure 4 gives the counterfactual distribution generated by adjusting for
the skill distribution. The changes in the distribution of skills over 1984 to
2000 have been such as to move people from the lower tail and the middle of
the distribution to the upper tail. This is not surprising, given the increase
in skill levels from 1984 to 2000. If the relative returns to the diﬀerent skills
do not change, then as the population gets more educated (skilled) - wages
will increase. This increase in wages will result in an upward mobility of
workers along the wage distribution.
3.3 Quantitative measures
In this section we discuss the quantitative contributions of the diﬀerent
factors to the changing wage distribution. All the reported statistics are
calculated using the estimated actual and counterfactual distributions The
results are reported in Table 4 below. The first two rows of Table 4 give the
descriptive statistics from the actual distributions for 1984 and 2000; rows
3 to 5 give the descriptive statistics from the counterfactual distributions
for 2000; row 6 is the total observed change from 1984 to 2000; and the
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subsequent rows give the eﬀect of the diﬀerent factors. We look at changes
in mean, standard deviation and quantile diﬀerences. Three quantile diﬀer-
ences are analyzed. While 90-10 diﬀerence captures the overall dispersion in
wages the 50-10 and 90-50 diﬀerences capture the eﬀect on the lower and the
upper tail of the distribution, respectively. Over this period while the 90-50
wage diﬀerential increased the 50-10 wage diﬀerential actually decreases.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics from actual and counterfactual log wage distribution
Mean SD 90-10a 90-50 50-10
Distribution:
1. Actual - 1984 3.743 0.780 1.904 0.924 0.980
2. Actual - 2000 3.674 0.822 2.023 1.139 0.884
Counterfactual distribution - 2000, controlling for:
3. Union levels 3.722 0.810 1.999 1.099 0.900
4. Employment shares 3.682 0.838 2.047 1.163 0.884
5. Skill distribution 3.496 0.772 1.856 1.012 0.844
6. Total change (row 2-row 1) -0.069 0.042 0.119 0.215 -0.096
Eﬀect of:
7. Unions (row 2-row 3) -0.049 0.012 0.024 0.040 -0.016
8. Employment (row 2-row 4) -0.008 -0.016 -0.024 -0.024 0
9. Skills (row 2-row 5) 0.178 0.050 0.167 0.127 0.040
a Diﬀerence between the 90th and the 10th percentiles of the log wage distribution.
The 50-10 and 90-50 statistics are defined similarly.
The analysis done here is not sequential, when we generate a counter-
factual distribution controlling for a particular factor, i.e. keeping it at its
1984 level, all the other factors impacting the wage distribution are assumed
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to be at their 2000 level. For example, when we generate a counterfactual,
where the distribution of skills is at the 1984 level, everything else - the
union levels, employment shares, gender distribution, regional distribution,
returns to all these covariates including the returns to skills, are assumed to
be at the 2000 level.21
The counterfactual for 2000 - controlling for union eﬀects - gives a higher
mean and a lower dispersion for 2000, compared to the actual values for 2000.
Over the period 1984 to 2000 the mean and the standard deviation of log
real wages decreased by 0.069 and 0.042 points respectively. 70% of the
decrease in mean and the 28% of the increase in standard deviation can
be attributed to de-unionization, ceteris paribus. If the union levels had
remained as they were in 1984 and the workers were paid according to the
wage schedule of 2000, then the real wages in year 2000 would have been
higher than those actually observed in 2000; the overall dispersion of wages
would have been lower; the 90-10 wage diﬀerential also would have been
lower; but the 50-10 wage diﬀerential would have been higher. While the
unions appear to compress the upper tail of the distribution, they seem to
increase the distance of the lower tail from the middle.22
To disentangle the eﬀect of the changing returns to skills and the increas-
ing levels of skills we look at the counterfactual for 2000, controlling for the
skill distribution. Comparing the 2000 actual distribution with the 2000
counterfactual distribution gives us the impact of change in the distribution
of skills. As the workers get older and more educated we see an increase in
inequality (0.772 to 0.822). This increase in inequality, independent of the
changing returns to skills, reflects the higher residual wage dispersion among
the older and more educated workers; also reflected in a bigger increase in
21Since the analyses are not not sequential in nature, nor are all the factors considered
orthogonal to each other, we cannot sum up the contribution of the diﬀerent factors.
22This is similar to the findings for the US, see DFL (Table III) and Freeman and Medoﬀ
(1984).
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the 90-50 wage diﬀerential compared to the 50-10 wage diﬀerential.23
If the skill levels had remained at their low 1984 levels, and workers paid
according to the wage schedule of 2000 the real wages would have fallen even
more. The fact that skill levels increased and there was an upward mobility
of workers, prevented some of the losses in average real wages.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a distributional analysis of the rising wage in-
equality in Mexico over the two decades of 1980s and the 1990s. While the
distributional approach is an improvement over the summary measures, it
too has some limitations. In particular the approach used here ignores the
general equilibrium eﬀects of the explanatory variables. This limitation is
shared by other approaches as well (for example regression based decompo-
sitions), however looking at distributions does further our understanding of
the rising wage inequality in Mexico.
To do our analysis we used nonparametric econometrics and focused on
entire distribution of wages under diﬀerent counterfactual scenarios. In this
sense this paper is diﬀerent from other studies on Mexico, which rely only
on the summary measures. We considered two main hypotheses proposed
in the literature — institutions and trade liberalization.24
We find declining unionization to be significant in explaining the decrease
in real wages. If the union membership had remained as it was in 1984 and
workers were paid according to the wage setting mechanisms of 2000, the
23Higher residual variance among the more educated and more experienced workers can
be explained by a Mincerian human capital model, see Lemieux (2003) for details. Juhn
et al (1993) interpret this residual variance as the ‘price’ for unmeasured human capitals,
which are assumed to be higher for the more educated and experienced workers. We
observe higher within-group inequality for other groups as well — inequality within union
and nonunion members (Table 2) and within diﬀerent sectors (Table 3) has also increased;
this is consistent with the findings of Gonzalez and McKinley (1997).
24As there are no self-employed workers in our sample, all findings are relevant only for
the ‘wage earners’, who form about 65% of the workforce in Mexico (World Bank).
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decline in real wages would have been much less. While number of studies
in the literature have noted the importance of unions in explaining the rise
in dispersion there role in explaining the fall in mean wages has not been
noted.
Though the shifts in employment have little eﬀect, they imply a decrease
in dispersion. Both the findings are consistent with the literature — the small
magnitude of the eﬀect is supported by Feliciano (2001) and Revenga (1997);
the direction of the eﬀect is supported by Esquivel et al. (2003).
Numbers of studies have convincingly associated the rise in inequality in
Mexico with the changing returns to skills. What we suggest in this paper
is that over this period the distribution of skills in Mexico has also changed,
and its eﬀect on the inequality should be considered. We find that changes
in skill distribution contribute in a big way to the rise in inequality, and
deserve further exploration.
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Appendix A
Table A1: Variable Definitions
Gender (g): 1 for male,0 otherwise
Union (u): 1 for union member, 0 otherwise
Employment (e): 1 if employed in the industrial sector, 0 otherwise
Industrial Sector includes: mineral and fuel extraction; electricity and
water; manufacturing industries including maquiladores; and construction.
Components of vector (x)
Age: age of the respondent; Age2: square of age
Education Dummies
No formal education - base category
Primary incomplete
Primary complete
Junior high incomplete
Junior high complete
High school incomplete
High school complete
Some college
College complete
More than college
Regional Dummies (r)
Southern states (Base): Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca,
Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz, Yucatan
Central states: Aquascalientes, Colima, Jalisco, Guanajuato,
Hidalgo, Mexico, Michoacan, Morelos, Puebla, Queretaro, Tlaxcala
Northern states: Baja California, Baja California Sur, Chihuahua,
Coahuila, Durango, Nayarit, Nuevo Leon, San Luis Potosi,
Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas, Zacatecas
Federal District
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Figure1: Wage Distribution 1984 and 2000
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Figure2: Wage Distribution of 2000 adjusted for union effects
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Figure3: Wage Distribution of 2000 adjusted for employment effects
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Figure4: Wage Distribution of 2000 adjusted for skill distribution
